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Thirty-Fourth Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS  
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

(This report covers the period from  
10 October through 16 October 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

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17 October 1973

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completed.

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17 October 1973

## Thirty-Fourth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS  
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS\*

(This report covers the week from  
10 October through 16 October 1973)

The Key Points

- Over 4,000 additional North Vietnamese troops have started their infiltration trek toward southern Laos and the area of the Communist's new supply corridor in western South Vietnam.
- Recent evidence indicates that during the past month more than 5,000 exfiltrating personnel have been moving northward in North Vietnam. The exact breakdown of these personnel is unknown, but the flow includes sick and wounded, POWs, and civilians going to North Vietnam for training.
- Communist logistic activity remained at low levels in North and South Vietnam as heavy rains and high winds from seasonal typhoons have caused extensive disruptions. In Laos, road repair and construction continues.
- The large number of Communist storage areas in MR 1 constructed since the January ceasefire could serve both military and economic/political functions.
- Combat activity remained at low levels in both South Vietnam and Laos last week.

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


### The Details

NOTE: This is the thirty-fourth in a series of memoranda summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

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#### I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

##### A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments

1. Personnel infiltration during the past week continued at a significant level, as six combat groups (one of which was included in last week's estimate) were observed in North Vietnam. The identification of these groups, all of which are traveling toward southern Laos, indicates that three currently undetected groups with about 1,500 additional troops also have started or are preparing to start toward that area. Ten smaller groups of specially-trained personnel also were reported starting south during the past week--about three-quarters of these personnel are traveling to northern GVN MR 1.

2. With the acceptance of these groups, the number of infiltrators starting south from North Vietnam after the 15 June "second" ceasefire is estimated to be about 24,000, some 22,000 of whom have been combat troops. Since the signing of the original ceasefire agreement on 27 January, more than 74,000 North Vietnamese personnel, including over

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# Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

## South Vietnam

### Regular Combat Forces

VC/NVA<sup>1</sup>RVNAF<sup>2</sup>

180,000

320,000

VC/NVA

86,000

325th

324B

320B

304th

711th

2nd

MR 1

RVNAF

89,000

VNMC

Airborne

1st

2nd

3rd

Regional

Forces

MR 2

VC/NVA

32,000

320th

10th

3rd

RVNAF

68,000

23rd

22nd

Regional

Forces

MR 3

VC/NVA

36,000

429th Sapper  
Command

9th

7th

5th

RVNAF

75,000

25th

18th

5th

Regional

Forces

MR 4

VC/NVA

26,000

1st

RVNAF

88,000

21st

9th

7th

44th Special

Tactical Zone

Regional Forces

Phu Quoc  
(Kien Giang)

Kien Giang

Phong Dinh

Chuong Thien

Ba Xuyen

Bac Lieu

An Xuyen

Con Son

An Giang

Sa Dec

Vinh Long

Kien Hoa

Vinh Binh

Phong Dinh

Chuong Thien

Ba Xuyen

Bac Lieu

An Xuyen

Con Son

An Giang

Sa Dec

Vinh Long

Kien Hoa

Vinh Binh

Phong Dinh

Chuong Thien

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66,000 combat troops and 8,000 specialists, have infiltrated southward. More than 49,000 of these personnel have started south since 27 January, while 25,000 were in the pipeline moving southward as of that date. (ANNEX B, [ ] contains a more detailed discussion of the information pertaining to infiltration which was received during the past week.)

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3. In mid-September, a sharp upswing in the northward movement of personnel through the pipeline occurred at about the same time Hanoi resumed the southward flow of combat troops on a large scale. Since then, more than 5,000 personnel have been reported moving northward through the North Vietnamese Panhandle. Although the precise composition of these personnel is unknown, the flow includes sick and wounded, civilians being sent to North Vietnam for training, and repatriated POWs. Currently, there is no evidence to suggest that the Communists are withdrawing any of their combat forces in South Vietnam, either as integral units or through the infiltration system.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies


North Vietnam

4. Logistic activity was light last week as heavy rains and high winds from seasonal typhoons swept into the North Vietnamese Panhandle. Despite the poor weather, Rear Service units continued to move some munitions--largely AAA and field artillery ammunition--in southern North Vietnam early in the week. On 14 October, however, another typhoon was reported close to the Panhandle, and Rear Service units were instructed to prepare for rains and severe flooding. This typhoon will probably further constrain logistic activity.

Laos

5. Communist units in the Laos Panhandle are still focusing primarily on road repair and construction. Only light vehicle activity was detected and

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was probably related to localized activity. Although Rear Service units should be capable of moving a high volume of supplies through this area within a few weeks, there have been no indications that such an upsurge is imminent.

### South Vietnam

6. The impact of the typhoons apparently was even more severe in northern South Vietnam than in North Vietnam. In this area, truck traffic was at a virtual standstill, communications were disrupted, many roads and bridges were washed out, and cargo in storage was damaged by water. In the near future Rear Service units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces probably will be concentrating on repairing recent flood damage and countering the effects of the expected new typhoon on the logistic system.

## II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

### A. South Vietnam

7. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15 June, and for the last week (10-16 Oct) are shown below:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since 27 January Ceasefire</u>		<u>Total Since 15 June Ceasefire</u>		<u>Last Week (10-16 Oct)</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,377	4,794	352	1,435	34	103
MR 2	548	3,720	284	1,866	15	117
MR 3	562	4,045	160	1,469	10	92
MR 4	1,105	9,903	427	3,737	24	245
Totals	3,592	22,462	1,223	8,507	83 (80)	557 (417) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

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8. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the charts on the following pages, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

9. The most significant combat incident of the week occurred on 13 October when Communist forces overran the South Vietnamese mountaintop outpost at Dach Ma, southeast of Hue. ARVN forces may try to retake the position, but resistance would be expected since the Communists are now in an excellent position to observe and report any government activities in the coastal lowlands and along Route 1 that will threaten their forces in the hills and mountains to the west.

B. Laos

10. There was no significant military activity in Laos last week.

III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Capabilities in Indochina


11. Since the January ceasefire, the North Vietnamese have constructed over 3,000 buildings, including 1,800 for general storage, along the highlands supply corridor, on Route 9 between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh, and in the Ba Long Valley. Some 240 buildings identified as suitable for ammunition and explosives storage can accommodate an estimated 70,000 short tons. The 1,800 general cargo storage buildings could house many times that amount. Obviously, many of the buildings could be used for purposes other than storage--such as vehicle and weapons repair and light industrial production activities. Such activities serve the North Vietnamese within the context of both their military and economic/political options.

(See Reverse Side of Page)



# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF


(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)





# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



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## ANNEX B

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese  
Personnel to the South

1. The southward flow of infiltrators from North Vietnam continued during the past week with the detection of six new regular combat groups and ten small, special-purpose groups in the Vinh area. Although all six combat groups were reported for the first time, one of them (5073) was previously included in our estimate as a "gap-fill" based on the observation of other groups in the 5xxx series (see last week's report). The detection this week of regular combat groups 5066, 5068, 5070, and 5071--all of which are traveling toward southern Laos--enables us to fill three more "gaps" in the series. The estimated 1,500 personnel in the three groups probably either have already infiltrated south or will do so soon. The inclusion of these groups and those detected during the week eliminates the block of seven missing groups reported last week.

2. The ten small groups observed for the first time during the past week at Binh Tram 8 in the Vinh area had an aggregate reported strength of some 200 personnel, about 150 of whom are moving towards Communist Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue in northern South Vietnam. Although most of the specialists reported moving during the past week were civilian administrators, three groups bore generic designators not previously observed. As a result, their composition and function are currently unclear. The appearance of ten new small groups in the Vinh area constitutes the largest number observed in the pipeline during a one-week period since last August and may indicate an upturn in special-purpose infiltration.

3. With the addition of more than 4,000 troops traveling to southern Laos/MR 559 during the past week, the total number of NVA troops who have started infiltrating toward this area since 1 September now stands at about 12,500--a level surpassing that (12,000)

sent to southern Laos/MR 559 during the entire 1972/73 dry season (September 1972 through June 1973). In past years, however, infiltration to this area often has occurred during a relatively short period in the first half of the dry season. Thus, while the level of combat infiltration observed thus far in the current dry season is larger than normal, it does not necessarily presage a continuing flow of infiltrators at the recent high rate. Although the assignment of these personnel at their destinations still is unknown, a recently intercepted message from southern Laos suggests that at least part of them may be used to strengthen administrative services units. Table 1 below shows the pattern of total infiltration starts, including specialists, since 1 January 1973. Table 2 compares the southward movement of combat troops since 1 September 1973 by destination with the same period in 1972.

Table 1

Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline  
Destined for South Vietnam, Southern  
Laos, and Cambodia Since 1 January 1973

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Special-Purpose</u>
January	20,000	1,600
February	10,200	2,100
March	3,250	2,250
April	1,925	1,200
May	7,175	300
June	2,200	700
July	3,650	600
August	2,200	700
September	7,000	0
October 1-16	9,800	300



Table 2

Comparative Starts by Combat Troops From  
North Vietnam, by Destination  
1 September - 16 October\*

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
Total	<u>9,500</u>	<u>16,500</u>
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	8,000	2,000
MR 5	1,500	2,000
B-3 Front	0	0
COSVN	0	0
Southern Laos/MR 559	0	12,500

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\* This table covers the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and southern Laos. Infiltrators moving to northern Laos are not included.

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